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ABSTRACT 
Alaska’s long-awaited legal approach to repressed memory syndrome and the 
discovery rule was announced in 2014 in the case of Maness v. Gordon. The 
Alaska Supreme Court held that discovery rule could not be invoked to toll 
the statute of limitations in repressed memory syndrome cases absent 
corroborating expert testimony. The court’s brief opinion in Maness provided 
little discussion on the scientific controversy surrounding repressed memory 
syndrome, created a relatively unique rule, and ultimately did not decide 
whether expert testimony would save a repressed memory syndrome claim. 
This Note aims to provide a deeper understanding of the controversy 
surrounding repressed memory syndrome in the scientific community and to 
compare and contrast Alaska’s new rule with the approaches of other states. 
Finally, this Note presents some alternative approaches the Alaska 
Legislature could consider and raises future issues that Maness did not 
address. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a pain – so utter – 
It swallows substance up – 
Then covers the Abyss with Trance – 
So Memory can step 
Around – across – upon it – 
As One within a Swoon – 
Goes safely – where an open eye – 
Would drop Him – Bone by Bone1 
 
It is common knowledge that amnesia may result from physical 
brain trauma. Take the widely publicized case of Trisha Meili, the 
Central Park Jogger, for example. In 1989, Meili was found in the New 
York City park brutally raped, beaten, and in a comatose state.2 Meili’s 
head injuries were so severe that she lost all memories of her activities 
between the four hours prior to her assault and the six weeks after; even 
today, she remains unable to recover them.3 The causal relationship 
between the incident and Meili’s memory loss is tragic and self-evident. 
But what about severe memory loss when physical injury to the 
brain has not occurred? The American Psychiatric Association 
acknowledges that amnesia may also result from traumatic experience, 
unconnected to head injury.4 Memory repression, the theory goes, can 
occur as a coping mechanism for individuals that have experienced 
traumatic events.5 Uninjured veterans6 and incest victims7 have 
 
 1.  Robert Howard, “Out of sound – Out of sight”: Emily Dickinson and the 
Poetics of Trauma, PSYART (July 21, 2005), http://www.psyartjournal.com/ 
article/show/howard-out_of_sound_out_of_sight_emily_dickinso. See Gail S. 
Goodman et al., Predictors of Accurate and Inaccurate Memories of Traumatic Events 
Experienced in Childhood, 3 CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION 269 (1994) (referencing 
the poem in relation to psychological trauma). 
 2.  Book Excerpt: ‘I Am the Central Park Jogger’, ABC NEWS 
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=1046580 (last visited May 31, 2016). 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 298 (5th ed. 2013) (explaining that the diagnostic criteria for 
dissociative amnesia is not attributable to neurological or medical conditions 
such as head injury). 
 5.  Gary M. Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie? 
Words of Caution About Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory 
Repression, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 129, 133 (1993). 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  See Judith Lewis Herman & Emily Schatzow, Recovery and Verification of 
Memories of Childhood Sexual Trauma, 4 PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOL. 1, 7–9 (1987) 
(discussing the stories of several incest survival support group participants who 
repressed some or all of the details about their abuse). 
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corroborated the existence of such a condition. Still, it remains hard to 
fathom the phenomena and the mechanics it works. 
Perhaps the biggest concern surrounding the believability of 
repressed memories is that they are, by definition, difficult to study and 
prove. Researchers cannot ethically design experiments where the types 
of traumatic events most commonly associated with memory repression, 
such as child molestation, are inflicted upon participants. Even if 
researchers could design such experiments, the fact that memory 
repression is unconscious prevents the creation of effective paradigms 
through which to obtain objective answers. How can we be sure that 
such amnesia really occurs? And, if we can’t be sure, what should we do 
when alleged victims claim to have rediscovered these memories 
decades after the fact and desire to sue in court? 
Until recently, Alaska case law pertaining to rediscovered 
repressed memories claims was nonexistent. Alaska was one of the last 
states silent towards the issue, despite having one of the top five rates of 
physical and sexual abuse of children in the United States8 and a high 
percentage of adult female sexual violence victims, approximately 
thirty-seven out of every one-hundred.9 It remains unclear whether the 
absence of repressed memory case law was due to a lack of repressed 
memory syndrome in Alaska or, rather, to victims’ reluctance to bring 
recovered memory claims forward.  
In 2014 the Alaska Supreme Court finally had the opportunity to 
determine the state’s stance on how to deal with repressed memory 
syndrome and statute of limitation laws in Maness v. Gordon.10 Bret 
Maness, pro se, sued several defendants for a series of sexual assaults he 
allegedly suffered as a child in the 1970s.11 Hoping to toll the statute of 
limitations of sexual assault, Maness explained that he had repressed all 
memories of the abuse until shortly before 2007, when he filed suit.12 
The superior court granted summary judgment for the defendants after 
Maness failed to respond to a defendant’s expert testimony on repressed 
memory syndrome with his own expert to support his story.13 The 
Alaska Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the discovery rule could 
 
 8.  Facts About Child Sexual Abuse, PROVIDENCE HEALTH & SERVICES, http:// 
alaska.providence.org/locations/cares/Pages/abusefacts.aspx (last visited May 
31, 2016). 
 9.  Intimate Partner Violence and Sexual Violence in the State of Alaska: Key 
Results from the 2010 Alaska Victimization Survey, UAA JUSTICE CENTER (2010), 
http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/research/2010/1004.avs_2010/1004.07a.statewide
_summary.pdf. 
 10.  325 P.3d 522 (Alaska 2014). 
 11.  Id. at 524. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at 525. 
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not be invoked to toll the statute of limitations absent expert evidence.14 
Maness set forth Alaska’s long-awaited legal approach to dealing 
with rediscovered memories but the opinion gave only a superficial 
discussion of the scientific controversy surrounding repressed memory 
syndrome and the court’s reasoning behind the decision. The holding 
additionally raises due process concerns for indigent victims that may 
have regained access to previously repressed memories of abuse and 
desire civil remedies. 
This Note discusses Maness v. Gordon in light of the nationwide 
controversy surrounding repressed memories and the implications the 
holding has for practitioners and future repressed memory plaintiffs. 
Part I of this Note explains the theory behind traumatic memory 
repression, the research involved, and its criticisms. Differing 
approaches taken by courts across the United States to tolling the statute 
of limitations for rediscovered memories are then presented and 
subsequently compared to the holding in Maness. Part II analyses the 
Alaska Supreme Court’s decision. Possible alternatives to the Maness 
approach are considered in Part III.  
I. REPRESSED MEMORY SYNDROME AND THE LAW 
A.  The Psychological Construct 
Repressed memory syndrome (“RMS”) was first officially 
recognized by the American Psychiatric Association in 1994 through the 
association’s inclusion of the disorder in the fourth edition of The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).15 The 
DSM was developed in response to the need for uniform classification 
system of metal disorders16 and is used as a guidebook for diagnoses by 
health care professionals in the United States and abroad.17 Revisions of 
the DSM are published periodically with the help of more than 1,000 
 
 14.  Id. at 526–27. 
 15.  Laura Johnson, Litigating Nightmares: Repressed Memories of Childhood 
Sexual Abuse, 51 S.C. L. REV. 939, 943 (2000); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC 
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 478 (4th ed. 1994). 
 16.  DSM: History of the Manual, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/dsm/dsm-history-of-the-manual (last 
 visited May 31, 2015). 
 17.  Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Frequently Asked Questions: What is the DSM and 
Why is it Important?, DSM-5 DEV., http://www.dsm5.org/about/Pages/ 
faq.aspx#1 (last visited May 31, 2016). The American Psychiatric Association 
Committee on Nomenclature and Statistics developed the first edition of the 
DSM based on the World Health Organization’s sixth edition of International 
Classification of Diseases. Id. 
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individuals and professional organizations in conducting 
comprehensive reviews of clinical and empirical literature.18 
The fifth and most recent edition of the DSM (DSM-5) was 
published in 2013 and continues to include RMS as recognized 
diagnosis.19 Alternatively termed “dissociative amnesia,”20 RMS is found 
in the DSM-5 within the broader field of dissociative disorders, 
disorders “characterized by a disruption of and/or discontinuity in the 
normal integration of consciousness [and] memory” in addition to 
disruptions in other areas of psychological function such as identity or 
behavior.21 Dissociative disorders regularly follow trauma and 
dissociative symptoms such as amnesia, numbing, and detachment from 
one’s self or surroundings are frequently experienced by those suffering 
from posttraumatic stress disorder and other stress-related mental 
illnesses.22 
Specifically, RMS is characterized by “an inability to recall 
autobiographical information, usually of a traumatic or stressful nature, 
that is inconsistent with normal forgetting.”23 The forgotten information 
may concern a mere aspect of an event, include an entire time period, or 
cover one’s own identity and life events.24 Furthermore, those suffering 
from RMS may or may not be aware that a memory gap even exists.25 In 
most cases, individuals are unaware of the memory loss unless it 
involves an aspect of their identity or normal life history.26 Dissociative 
amnesia, of course, does not cover disturbances in memory attributable 
to “physiological effects of a substance . . . or a neurological or other 
medical condition.”27 Unlike permanent amnesias due to some sort of 
physical or chemical altercation to the brain that prevents memory 
storage or retrieval, one unique aspect of dissociative amnesia is its 
reversibility: although the memory is presently inaccessible, it was at 
one point successfully stored and may therefore be regained.28  
The prevalence of RMS on a national scale would be hard to 
calculate accurately, though the DSM discusses a 12-month RMS 
prevalence study among adults in a small U.S. community.29 The study 
 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 4. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 291. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 298. 
 24.  Id. at 291. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 298. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 299. 
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reported a RMS prevalence of 1.8% in the community, specifically 1.0% 
among males and 2.6% for females.30 Instances of RMS have been 
observed in individuals of all ages, however, from children to teenagers 
to adults.31 
Theories about the psychological motivation for RMS suggest that 
repression occurs in some individuals as an involuntary ego-defense 
mechanism to keep traumatic, painful, or socially unacceptable 
memories from conscious awareness—in doing so, these individuals can 
continue to function normally in everyday life.32 Repression of similarly 
unacceptable feelings or impulses may occur for this same reason and 
they, like repressed memories, remain present in one’s brain but are 
pushed into unconscious thought.33 Though the individual is granted 
immediate relief, the repressed stress may reveal itself in other ways,34 
however, such as through manifestations of depression, sexual 
dysfunction, self-harm, and an impaired ability to maintain 
relationships.35 Eventual recovery of these repressed memories may 
occur at a more convenient stage in one’s life where the trauma can be 
dealt with, and recovery is claimed to have been triggered both with and 
without therapy.36 
However, determining with certainty how conscious—let alone 
unconscious—memory functions is incredibly difficult. Due to the 
unethical nature of the events associated with the onset of repression, 
researchers are precluded morally and by Institutional Review Boards 
from significantly testing and experimenting with RMS and its 
underlying theory.37 Thus, any support for the existence of repressed 
memory syndrome must be clinical or statistical. 
In a unique attempt to gain insight into how children remember 
traumatic experiences, researchers located forty-three children ranging 
from three to ten years old scheduled to undergo a painful medical 
procedure involving urethral catheterization.38 These subjects were 
interviewed at various stages following the procedure to determine the 
 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 5; Jacqueline Kanovitz, Hypnotic Memories 
and Civil Sexual Abuse Trials, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1185, 1204 (1992). 
 33.  Kanovitz, supra note 33. 
 34.  Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 5, at 137. 
 35.  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 4, at 299. 
 36.  Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 5, at 137–38. 
 37.  See Institutional Review Board Guidebook: Introduction, OFF. FOR HUM. RES. 
PROTECTIONS, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/irb/irb_introduction.htm 
(last visited May 31, 2016) (“[B]rutal or inhumane treatment of human subjects is 
never morally justified.”). 
 38.  Gail S. Goodman et al., supra note 1, at 275. 
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extent and accuracy of their recollection of the procedure’s events.39 
Results supported the conclusion that age was correlated with 
significantly greater accuracy and resistance to misinformation.40 Thus, 
memory repression seems more likely to occur at younger ages, which 
makes sense in light of the frequency of repressed child abuse memory 
claims. Controlling for age, repetition of the procedure did not 
significantly affect memory, though other factors, such as the emotional 
support provided by the children’s parents, was correlated with better 
recollection.41 This suggests that memory repression may be mitigated 
through social support immediately surround the traumatic event.  
A more typical example of repressed memory research comes from 
a 1987 study by Herman and Schatzow, who interviewed fifty-three 
women in an incest survivor therapy group about their experiences.42 
This research was especially important because most of these women 
had corroborating evidence of their abuse, which is rare. Sixty-four 
percent of these women reported at least some degree of amnesia related 
to the abuse, and twenty-eight percent described severe deficits.43 Abuse 
involving violence or occurring prior to adolescence was positively 
correlated with memory loss.44  
Further support for the existence of repressed memories comes 
from widespread survey data. One survey directed by Diana Elliot 
gathered national data from 225 men and 280 women, aged eighteen to 
seventy-five.45 A majority of survey participants who had been involved 
in a traumatic event, including “childhood sexual abuse, military 
combat, or witnessing the murder or suicide of a loved one,” did not 
suffer from subsequent memory loss; however, approximately twenty 
percent of respondents experienced a period of temporary amnesia 
surrounding the entire event.46 Remembrance of these episodes was 
generally triggered by an event, such as reading something about the 
incident in the media.47 Approximately thirty-three percent of 
respondents who had been victims of childhood sexual abuse recovered 
memories during intercourse later in their adult lives.48 In contrast to the 
 
 39.  Id. at 276. 
 40.  Id. at 278. 
 41.  Id. 
  42. Herman & Schatzow, supra note 7, at 10. 
 43.  Id. at 4. 
 44.  Id. at 5. 
 45.  Bruce Bower, Trauma Survey Delves into Delayed Recall, SCI. NEWS (Aug. 
26, 1995), http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Trauma+survey+delves+into 
+delayed+recall.-a017288645. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
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DSM survey discussed earlier, the results of this survey suggest that 
RMS may actually affect a substantial number of individuals in some 
form. 
Still, given the inability to scientifically reproduce RMS in the 
controlled laboratory setting, many are not convinced of its existence. 
Adding fuel to the fire are studies exposing the general vulnerability of 
memories and, in some cases, even the implantation of false memories, 
which raise questions about the validity of recovered memories.49  
People’s stored memories can be altered to include false 
information.50 Research concerning this “misinformation effect” was 
first published in 2005 and involved presenting subjects with a video of 
an event, such as the theft of a girl’s wallet.51 Some subjects were then 
subsequently misinformed about certain aspects of the event, including 
the girl receiving an arm injury, when it was apparent from the footage 
that only her neck had been hurt.52 When interviewed later, 
approximately forty-seven percent of participants claimed to have 
remembered the later-provided misinformation as having actually been 
part of the event.53 If memory repression does occur, repressed 
memories could be just as vulnerable to the issues of malleability as 
normal memories, perhaps even more so because of how much time has 
passed. One counter to this critique, however, is that unconscious 
memories are unlike conscious memories insomuch that they do not 
have the same opportunity for modification through rehearsal, as 
exemplified in experiments like these. Perhaps unconscious memories 
are actually less subject to misinformation because we are unable to 
consciously revise them according to conflicting outside information. 
Researchers have also delved into the possibility of implanting false 
memories of entire events in an individual’s mind.54 Loftus and Coan 
 
 49.  See Elizabeth F. Loftus, When a Lie Becomes Memory’s Truth: Memory 
Distortion After Exposure to Misinformation, 1 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 121 (1992) (discussing many studies demonstrating the malleability of 
memory). 
 50.  See Elizabeth F. Loftus, Planting Misinformation in the Human Mind: A 30-
year Investigation of the Malleability of Memory, 12 LEARNING MEMORY 361 (2005) 
(discussing several research studies on the effects of misinformation on memory, 
including one where subjects who watched a video of an event, and then were 
given incorrect information about the event, incorporated the incorrect 
information into their actual memory of watching the event). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  See Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Reality of Repressed Memories, 48 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 518, 530 (1993) (“There are numerous anecdotes and experimental 
studies that show it is indeed possible to lead people to construct entire 
events.”). 
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created several paradigms in which false memories were implanted in 
child subjects by trusted family members.55 One of the most memorable 
was described in a 1993 report: a fourteen-year-old boy named Chris 
was convinced by his older brother Jim that he had been lost in a 
shopping mall at the age of five when in truth such an event had not 
happened.56 Jim’s story about Chris was told to Chris as follows: 
It was 1981 or 1982. I remember that Chris was 5. We had gone 
shopping at the University City shopping mall in Spokane. 
After some panic, we found Chris being led down the mall by a 
tall, oldish man (I think he was wearing a flannel shirt). Chris 
was crying and holding the man’s hand. The man explained 
that he had found Chris walking around crying his eyes out 
just a few moments before and was trying to help him find his 
parents.57 
In the days following this story, Chris began to “remember” how 
he had felt while lost at the mall, and made statements such as “[t]hat 
day I was so scared that I would never see my family again. I knew that 
I was in trouble” and “I remember mom telling me never to do that 
again.”58 
A period of weeks later, Chris was capable of providing great detail 
about the made-up event.59 He stated to his family: 
I was with you guys for a second and I think I went over to 
look at the toy store, the Kay-bee toy, and uh, we got lost and I 
was looking around and I thought, “Uh-oh. I’m in trouble 
now.” You know. And then I . . . I thought I was never going to 
see my family again. I was really scared you know. And then 
this old man, I think he was wearing a blue flannel, came up to 
me . . . he was kind of old. He was kind of bald on top . . . he 
had like a ring of gray hair . . . and he had glasses.60 
The ability of the mind to create vivid but false memories out of lies 
illustrates the fragile nature of memory and it’s potential for 
manipulation, especially, as illustrated by Loftus and Coan, in children.  
Similarly, techniques by police have induced false memories of 
defendants in interrogations.61 In the infamous case of Paul Ingram, 
 
 55.  Id. at 532. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  See id. at 533 (discussing how five months of police interrogation caused 
Paul Ingram to create and confess to memories of fantastical allegations); 
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Ingram was accused of and arrested for the molestation of his two 
daughters following their return from a church camp that supported the 
discovery and recollection of such memories.62 Long employed in the 
Olympia, Washington Sheriff’s Office as chief civil deputy, Ingram 
denied the abuse but was convinced after five months of interrogation 
by detectives and a psychologist that he had committed “rapes, assaults, 
child sexual abuse, and [participated] in a Satan-worshipping cult 
alleged to have murdered 25 babies”63 and even began to describe 
increasingly fantastical memories of such events.64 Ingram couldn’t 
believe that his daughters could be wrong about experiencing such 
conduct, and believed satanic possession was possible as part of his 
religious beliefs.65 Richard Ofshe, a psychologist, was hired by the 
prosecution for trial.66 Ofshe tested Ingram by attempting to convince 
Ingram that he had committed an additional, fabricated act of 
molestation on his children.67 As a result, Ingram developed memories 
of the event to such a detailed extent that he could write a confession 
several pages long.68 Despite being presented this discovery, Ingram 
was so convinced of his newfound memories that he pled guilty to his 
charges and was sentenced to twenty years in prison.69 
It is clear from Paul Ingram’s case that false memories can have 
devastating consequences, and that those who believe them are capable 
of describing those false memories in great detail and certainty. This 
certainty likely also influences those who hear them. As the recollections 
of repressed memories are often assisted through therapy, there is 
similarly great concern that therapists may implant false memories in 
their patients.70 Several cases surrounding the issue of therapy-derived 
implanted memories popped up around the US during the 1980s and 
90s, a period that has been compared to the Salem witch trials.71 
Patients have come forward to discuss the suggestive nature of 
 
Richard A. Leo, The Social and Legal Construction of Repressed Memory, 22 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 653, 656 (1997) (discussing how once police interrogation ended, 
Paul Ingram realized his memories were coerced). 
 62.  Leo, supra note 61, at 655. 
 63.  Loftus, supra note 54, at 533. 
 64.  Leo, supra note 61, at 655. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Loftus, supra note 54, at 533. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Leo, supra note 61, at 656. 
 70.  See Loftus, supra note 54, at 533 (discussing the great need for research 
and reexamination of psychotherapy practices). 
 71.  Jorge L. Carro & Joseph V. Hatala, Recovered Memories, Extended Statutes 
of Limitations and Discovery Exceptions in Childhood Sexual Abuse Cases: Have We 
Gone Too Far?, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1239, 1245 (1996). 
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their therapy sessions.72 Elizabeth F. Loftus discusses the informative 
experience of Greg Zimmerman, among others, in an article on 
repressed memories.73 An interview with Zimmerman on ABC News in 
1992 led to the discussion of his experience seeing a psychotherapist in 
an attempt to cope with the suicide of his father.74 He expressed that “I 
would try to talk to her about the things that were very painful in my 
life and she kept saying that there was something else.”75 Eventually she 
told Zimmerman that he exhibited the characteristics of a victim of 
satanic ritual abuse.76 Zimmerman, an attorney, was fairly certain he had 
not experienced any satanic abuse in his life, and could not understand 
how the therapist could have come to such a conclusion.77 Around this 
time, the False Memory Syndrome Foundation was established as a 
source of support and public awareness by parents across the country 
falsely accused of incest.78 Several books criticizing the unprecedented 
increase in child sex abuse cases and the popularization of repressed 
memory syndrome as a disorder were also published.79  
This history of suggestive therapy and implanted memories casts a 
shadow of doubt over the accuracy of recovered repressed memories, 
particularly for those recovered by therapists. It also brings into 
question whether any state law requiring therapist expert testimony is 
actually meaningful in determining whether or not to allow such a 
lawsuit to proceed. 
B.  The Legal Response  
As the issues of RMS broke into the legal arena in the 1980s and 
90s, courts had to determine the admissibility of expert witness 
testimony on RMS and, in cases where the statute of limitations had run 
out, whether to allow such testimony for the purposes of the discovery 
 
 72.  See Loftus, supra note 54, at 528 (describing client descriptions of the 
suggestive techniques used in their therapy sessions). 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Early History of the False Memory Syndrome Foundation, FALSE MEMORY 
SYNDROME FOUND., http://www.fmsfonline.org/?about=EarlyHistory (last 
updated Dec. 13, 2013). 
 79.  See, e.g., MARK PENDERGRAST, VICTIMS OF MEMORY: SEX ABUSE 
ACCUSATIONS AND SHATTERED LIVES (2d ed. 1996); RICHARD OFSHE & ETHAN 
WATTERS, MAKING MONSTERS: FALSE MEMORIES, PSYCHOTHERAPY, AND SEXUAL 
HYSTERIA (1996); ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, THE MYTH OF 
REPRESSED MEMORY: FALSE MEMORIES AND ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE (reprt. 
rev. 1996). 
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rule. 
Statutes of limitations are the result of the legislative belief that 
eventually “the right to be free of stale claims . . . prevail[s] over the 
right to prosecute them.”80 The idea that claims have an expiration 
period protects both defendants and the courts from cases “in which the 
search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence.”81 
Witnesses die, physical evidence is lost, and, as discussed above, 
memories fade, resulting in difficulty for both mounting a defense and 
determining a case. Thus, statutes of limitations allow for better 
accuracy in settling claims, and encourage plaintiffs to either bring suit 
or forever hold their peace. 
Nonetheless, courts have recognized that, in some cases, statutes of 
limitations may need to be tolled in the interest of fairness. In these 
cases, states have adopted what is commonly known as the “discovery 
rule,” which generally delays statutes of limitations from accruing until 
the harm committed by the defendant is actually discovered.82 The 
discovery rule was traditionally applied in medical malpractice cases. 
For example, the rule was applied in cases where surgical instruments 
were left in patients during surgery and the patient became aware of 
that fact only after the statute of limitations had passed.83 
Application of the discovery doctrine has been sought by plaintiffs 
in recovered repressed memory cases. The first case attempting to toll 
the discovery rule was unsuccessful. In Tyson v. Tyson,84 the Washington 
state Supreme Court refused to apply a delayed discovery rule to toll the 
statute of limitations for the plaintiff, who claimed she had repressed all 
memory of her father sexually assaulting her over a nine-year period 
until she had entered therapy fifteen years later.85 The court explained 
that the discovery rule may only apply in cases where “the objective 
nature of the evidence makes it substantially certain that the facts can be 
 
 80.  United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (quoting R.R. 
Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)). 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 70 
(2011) (“Because lack of notice and disability on the part of the claimant—
particularly when combined with dissembling or concealment on the part of the 
defendant—are among the principal grounds on which a delay in bringing suit 
may be excused, restitution claimants in such circumstances will often be 
granted the protection of a discovery rule.”). 
 83.  See, e.g., Ruth v. Dight, 453 P.2d 631 (Wash. 1969) (holding that the 
discovery rule shall be applied when medical malpractice occurs as a result of 
negligently leaving foreign articles in surgery patients). 
 84.  727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986) (en banc), superseded by statute, WASH. REV. 
CODE. ANN. § 4.16.340 (West 1988). 
 85.  Id. at 229–30. 
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fairly determined even though considerable time has passed since the 
alleged events occurred.”86 To allow application of the discovery rule to 
recovered repressed memory actions would defeat the purpose of 
statute of limitations, given that the balance of interests weighed in 
favor of defendants given the low likelihood of ascertaining the truth.87 
The Washington legislature made the ruling obsolete, however, by 
enacting Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.340. The statute provides that actions 
based on childhood sexual abuse claims may be brought “[w]ithin three 
years of the time the victim discovered or reasonably should have 
discovered that the injury or condition was caused by said act.”88 This 
act was the first to apply the discovery doctrine to civil cases of 
childhood sexual abuse.89 
Since Tyson v. Tyson,90 legal approaches to dealing with RMS 
amongst the several states have varied. Some states have passed statutes 
providing extended periods of time for which child sex abuse claims 
may be brought.91 In states without such provisions—or even in states 
like Alaska, which passed such a provision, but non-retroactively—
tolled claims must be fit into broader tolling statutes or into common 
law discovery rule. State courts have split between whether to allow 
application of the discovery rule to tolled recovered repressed claims. 
Some states refuse to apply the discovery rule to any types of cases 
under any circumstances. Idaho, for example, has declared that it “is not 
a discovery jurisdiction.”92 States that do apply the discovery rule have 
provided a variety of reasons for refusing to do so in RMS cases. The 
Maryland Court of Appeals, for example, held that RMS does not 
activate the discovery rule because it is “unconvinced that repression 
exists as a phenomenon separate and apart from the normal process of 
forgetting.”93 The Supreme Court of Michigan declined to apply the 
discovery rule or a statutory insanity grace period because doing so 
“would endanger precisely those policy goals advanced by statutes of 
 
 86.  Id. at 229. 
 87.  Id. at 230. 
 88.  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West 1988). 
 89.  See Julie M. Kosmond Murray, Repression, Memory, and Suggestibility: A 
Call for Limitations on the Admissibility of Repressed Memory Testimony in Sexual 
Abuse Trials, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 477, 487 (“Since [WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
4.16.340], at least twenty-eight other states have adopted similar legislation.”). 
 90.  727 P.2d 226. 
 91.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.140 (1990); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-130 
(1993); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-103.7 
(1994). 
 92.  Bonner v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Boise, 913 P.2d 567, 568 (Idaho 
1996). 
 93.  Doe v. Maskell, 679 A.2d 1087, 1092 (Md. 1996). 
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limitations.”94 Unlike the majority of jurisdictions who allow the 
discovery rule in RMS claims, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
follows an objective approach to limitation periods and thus applies the 
discovery rule in only the most limited of circumstances “by focusing on 
the nature of the injury rather than the particularities of the specific 
plaintiff.”95 In S.V. v. R.V.,96 the Texas Supreme Court refused to apply 
the discovery rule based on “expert testimony on subjects about which 
there is no settled scientific view” because of the inability to provide 
objective verification of the claim.97 Minnesota has taken a similar view: 
that expert testimony on the theory of repressed and recovered memory 
may lack foundational reliability and therefore may not be used to show 
timeliness.98  
A substantial number of states allow RMS claims to extend the 
statute of limitations, though expert testimony may be required at trial.99 
In Doe v. Roe,100 the Arizona Supreme Court explained that allowing 
application of the discovery rule to RMS cases was consistent with the 
underlying policy of the discovery rule, and “logically appropriate given 
that the intentional act of the tortfeasor caused both the damage and the 
repression of memory.”101 To hold otherwise would reward perpetrators 
and contradict the Arizona legislature’s policy of imposing severe 
criminal penalties for the sex abuse of children.102 In its first RMS case, 
New Hampshire simply explained that it found “no reason why it 
should not apply.”103 
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmatively held the 
discovery rule applicable to RMS cases, reasoning that “equating a 
 
 94.  Lemmerman v. Fealk, 534 N.W.2d 695, 702 (Mich. 1995). 
 95.  Dalrymple v. Brown, 701 A.2d 164, 170–71 (Pa. 1997). 
 96.  933 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1996). 
 97.  Id. at 18. 
 98.  Doe v. Archdiocese of Saint Paul, 817 N.W.2d 150, 171 (Minn. 2012). 
 99.  These states include the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, 
Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Utah. 
See, e.g., Farris v. Compton, 652 A.2d 49 (D.C. 1994); Dunlea v. Dappen, 924 P.2d 
196 (Haw. 1996), abrogated by Hac v. Univ. of Hawai’i, 73 P.3d 46 (Haw. 2003); 
Doe v. Cherwitz, 518 N.W.2d 362 (Iowa 1994); Nuccio v. Nuccio, 673 A.2d 1331 
(Me. 1996); Sheehan v. Sheehan, 901 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. 1995) (en banc), reh’g denied 
(July 25, 1995); Petersen v. Bruen, 792 P.2d 18 (Nev. 1990); McCollum v. D’Arcy, 
638 A.2d 797 (N.H. 1994); Peterson v. Huso, 552 N.W.2d 83 (N.D. 1996); Ault v. 
Jasko, 637 N.E.2d 870 (Ohio 1994), superseded by statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2305.11 (West 2006), as recognized in Pratte v. Stewart, 929 N.E.2d 415 (Ohio 
2010); Lovelace v. Keohane, 831 P.2d 624 (Okla. 1992); Olsen v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 
1345 (Utah 1993). 
 100.  955 P.2d 951 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc). 
 101.  Id. at 960. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  McCollum, 638 A.2d at 799. 
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repressed memory to merely ‘forgetting’ ignores advances in the 
understanding of the human mind.”104 Although RMS does not concern 
a precise science, the court determined that “the same can be said about 
many cases involving a ‘battle of experts.’”105 In court, expert testimony 
must prove both the abuse and that the memories of the abuse were 
repressed106; however, application of the discovery rule and the 
existence of corroborating evidence are questions of fact for the jury to 
determine.107  
Including Alaska, some states require something extra at the 
pleading stage for discovery rule to apply in RMS cases. Oklahoma 
requires by statute objective, verifiable evidence that the victim 
psychologically repressed the memory of the facts upon which that 
claim was predicated and that the alleged sexual abuse occurred.108 New 
Mexico requires “competent medical or psychological testimony” for 
discovery rule to apply.109 Application of these two statutes has yet to be 
tested in court.  
Taking a slightly different approach, California requires 
“certificates of merit” to be filed in order for discovery rule to apply in 
child abuse cases where the plaintiff is of 26 years of age or older.110 
These certificates of merit require that the attorney review the facts of 
the case with at least one licensed mental health practitioner who is not a 
party to the litigation and has concluded that there is reasonable and 
meritorious cause to file the action.111 
The Alaska Supreme Court held in Maness that expert testimony is 
required for the discovery rule to apply in RMS cases; however, in 
contrast to states like South Carolina, Alaska did not treat discovery rule 
as a question of fact for the jury. The requirement instead serves a 
barrier between RMS plaintiffs and a jury if the abuse they suffered 
occurred prior to the enactment of Alaska’s current limitation-extending 
statutes and they cannot afford expert testimony at the pleading stage. 
While such a rule is not without support, it is perhaps more unique than 
Maness suggests.  
  
 
 104.  Moriarty v. Garden Sanctuary Church of God, 534 S.E.2d 672, 677 (S.C. 
2000). 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. at 679. 
 107.  Id. at 681. 
 108.  OKLA. STAT. 12, § 95(6) (2006). 
 109.  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-30A(2) (1996). 
 110.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1(g) (West 2004). 
 111.  § 340.1(h). 
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II. MANESS V. GORDON: REQUIRING REPRESSED MEMORY EXPERT 
TESTIMONY FOR DISCOVERY RULE IN ALASKA 
A.  The Facts 
The facts discussed in the opinion surrounding Maness v. Gordon112 
are brief, and there is limited information to be found on the online 
docket besides motions to waive fees, bonds, or filing extensions.113 The 
Alaska State Law Library has on file three other documents from the 
appeal from the Superior Court: Maness’s opening brief, the brief of the 
Gordon appellees, and the brief of appellee James Serfling. Factual 
information from these briefs is included here to supplement the 
Supreme Court’s opinion.  
In the Anchorage superior court on October 30, 2007, Bret Maness, 
representing himself pro se, sued Mike Gordon, Shelley Gordon, James 
Serfling, and nine other defendants for assault and battery, sexual 
assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false 
imprisonment, based on a series of alleged sexual assaults inflicted on 
him as a child in the 1970s.114 According to Maness, the acts took place in 
a backroom of the Mike and Shelly Gordon’s Novelty shop, near Fourth 
Avenue and D Street in downtown Anchorage when he was eleven 
years old.115 Maness claims he was given date rape drugs, put under 
hypnosis, and sexually assault on several occasions.116 The hypnosis was 
allegedly so strong that Maness had no recollection of the incident 
between assaults and instead recalled only making purchases at the 
store.117 Maness said he returned to the shop several times and 
occasionally brought friends, who were likewise hypnotized and 
assaulted.118 Eventually, Maness had a break in his hypnosis and made a 
report to the police.119 Maness then realized “nothing would be done to 
the Gordons by APD [and] [s]o he decided he must do something 
himself.”120 Maness allegedly vandalized the store by throwing rocks at 
 
 112.  325 P.3d 522 (Alaska 2014). 
 112.   See e.g., Alaska Appellate Courts Case Management System, ALASKA STATE 
APPELLATE COURTS, http://www.appellate.courts.state.ak.us/main.asp (entering 
into the search engine the Maness v. Gordon Appellate Case Number S14753). 
 114.  Maness, 325 P.3d at 524. 
 115.  Appellant’s Opening Brief, at 2, Maness v. Gordon, 325 P.3d 522 (Alaska 
2014) (No. S-14753) [hereinafter Maness Brief]. 
 116.  Maness Brief, supra note 115, at 3–6. 
 117.  Id. at 4. 
 118.  Id. at 4–5. 
 119.  Id. at 5. 
 120.  Id. 
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it.121 
Maness claimed his mother also reported to the police that 
suspicious activity was occurring at the novelty shop.122 Maness was 
subsequently called to meet with the vice-principal at his elementary 
school.123 In that meeting, Maness claims to have been hypnotized by 
vice-principal Serfling, who instructed him to “forget all about that 
novelty shop.”124 Maness claims the hypnosis worked and that he 
completely forgot about all of these events until shortly before the case 
was filed.125 
Denying all of the allegations against them, defendants moved for 
summary judgment, arguing that the applicable statute of limitations 
had run.126 Maness argued that his recent recovery of his repressed 
memories should cause the discovery rule to apply, therefore tolling his 
time to bring a claim until his memories had been recovered.127 
Defendants retained a developmental and experimental psychologist, 
Dr. Brainerd, who proclaimed Maness’s claims as inconsistent with 
repressed memory syndrome in an affidavit to the court.128 The court 
then ordered Maness to respond in kind with the affidavit of a qualified 
expert to support his claim.129 When Maness failed to do so, the superior 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.130 
Maness appealed, arguing (1) that his claims were timely under 
sections 09.10.065(a) and 09.10.140(b) of the Alaska Statutes; (2) that the 
discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations until he recovered the 
repressed memories and thus his claims are timely; and (3) requiring an 
indigent plaintiff to provide expert testimony violates the due process 
clauses of the Alaska and United States Constitutions.131 
B.  AS 09.10.065 and AS 09.10.140  
Sections 09.10.065(a)132 and 09.10.140(b)133 of the Alaska Statutes 
provide for the tolling or elimination of statute of limitations for certain 
 
 121.  Id. at 5–6. 
 122.  Id. at 6. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Maness v. Gordon, 325 P.3d 522, 524 (Alaska 2014). 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 524–25. 
 129.  Id. at 525. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at 525–27. 
 132.  ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.065(a) (2013). 
 133.  Id. § 09.10.140(b). 
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sexual abuse claims. Section 09.10.065(a) provides as follows: 
A person may bring an action at any time for conduct that 
would have, at the time the conduct occurred, violated 
provisions of any of the following offenses: (1) felony sexual 
abuse of a minor; (2) felony sexual assault; (3) unlawful 
exploitation of a minor; (4) felony sex trafficking; or (5) felony 
human trafficking.134 
 
Section 09.10.140 provides: 
(a) . . . [I]f a person entitled to bring an action mentioned in this 
chapter is at the time the cause of action accrues either (1) 
under the age of majority, or (2) incompetent by reason of 
mental illness or mental disability, the time of a disability 
identified in (1) or (2) of this subsection is not a part of the time 
limit for the commencement of the action. Except as provided 
in (b) of this section, the period within which the action may be 
brought is not extended in any case longer than two years after 
the disability ceases. 
(b) An action based on a claim of sexual abuse under AS 
09.55.650 [providing for claims based on sexual abuse to a 
minor under sixteen years of age] that is subject to AS 
09.10.065(b) [which sets the statute of limitations for 
misdemeanor sexual abuse of a minor and misdemeanor sexual 
assault at three years] may be brought more than three years 
after the plaintiff reaches the age of majority if it is brought 
under the following circumstances: 
(1) if the claim asserts that the defendant committed one 
act of sexual abuse on the plaintiff, the plaintiff shall 
commence the action within three years after the plaintiff 
discovered or through use of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered that the act caused the injury or condition; 
(2) if the claim asserts that the defendant committed more 
than one act of sexual abuse on the plaintiff, the plaintiff 
 
 134.  Id. § 09.10.065. It should additionally be noted that section 
11.81.900(a)(24) of the Alaska Statutes provides that “felony” means a crime for 
which a sentence of imprisonment for a term of more than one year is 
authorized. Alaska law considers sexual abuse of a minor in the first, second, 
and third degrees to be felonies, and sexual abuse of a minor in the fourth 
degree to be a misdemeanor. Id. §§ 11.41.434, 11.41.436, 11.41.438, 11.41.440. As 
the court found these statutes not retroactively applicable, there is no discussion 
on whether or not, if the statutes were applicable, section 09.10.065(a) would 
apply. The ages of defendants in comparison to the plaintiff at the time of the 
alleged assaults are not discussed. 
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shall commence the action within three years after the 
plaintiff discovered or through use of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered the effect of the injury or condition 
attributable to the series of acts; a claim based on an 
assertion of more than one act of sexual abuse is not 
limited to plaintiff’s first discovery of the relationship 
between any one of those acts and the injury or condition, 
but may be based on plaintiff’s discovery of the effect of 
the series of acts.135 
The Alaska Supreme Court found these two statutes to be 
inapplicable to Maness’s case, as “both of these statutes were enacted 
long after the events [Maness] describes in his complaint,136 and neither 
applies retroactively.”137 In arriving at this conclusion, the court cited 
Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska v. Does,138 a 2006 case where the Alaska 
Supreme Court considered whether section 09.10.065 applied 
retroactively to civil claims of abuse despite the legislature’s clear 
intention to prevent retroactive effect of the statute on covered criminal 
claims.139 Under section 01.10.090, which states that “[no] statute is 
retrospective unless expressly declared therein,” a presumption in 
Alaska exists against retrospective legislation.140 In light of section 
01.10.090, Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska held that without the 
legislature’s express provision for retroactive effect to civil claims under 
section 09.10.065, such protection did not apply in light of clear 
legislative expression that there was no retroactive application to 
criminal claims.141 Although section 09.10.140 had not previously been 
held as non-retroactive, the Maness court determined that neither the 
statute itself nor the session laws surrounding it contained any language 
providing express legislative intent to do so.142 
C.  Discovery Rule  
Without the protection of either statute, Maness’s claim could only 
be considered timely if the discovery rule was applicable.143 The opinion 
 
 135.  Id. § 09.10.140(b). 
 136.  Section 09.10.065(a) was enacted in 2001, section 09.10.140(b) was 
enacted in 1990, and the latest event described by Maness apparently occurred in 
1985. Maness, 325 P.3d at 525 n.9. 
 137.  Id. at 525. 
 138.  141 P.3d 719 (Alaska 2006). 
 139.  Id. at 720. 
 140.  ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.090 (1962). 
 141.  Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska, 141 P.3d at 724–25. 
 142.  Maness, 325 P.3d at 525 n.10. 
 143.  Id. at 525. 
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explains the discovery rule as “where an element of a claim is not 
immediately apparent, the statute of limitations does not begin to run 
until a reasonable person would have enough information to alert him 
that he ‘has a potential cause of action or should begin an inquiry to 
protect . . . her rights.’”144 To bolster his argument, Maness cited Phillips 
v. Gelpke,145 a New Jersey case, for the proposition that expert testimony 
was unnecessary to invoke the discovery rule in his case.146 
In Gelpke, 19-year-old Phillips sued her uncle Gelpke for childhood 
sexual abuse, the memory of which she had for some time repressed.147 
Though Phillips provided expert testimony at trial on her psychological 
suffering, the expert did not diagnose Phillips with repressed memory 
syndrome.148 The jury returned a verdict for Phillips and Gelpke 
appealed, arguing that such a diagnosis was necessary.149 The New 
Jersey Supreme Court determined that because Philips had recovered 
her memories without expert help, an expert’s explanation of how she 
could recover such memories was not necessary.150 
The Alaska Supreme Court found that Gelpke did not support 
Maness’s claims because under the facts of that case, the statute of 
limitations for Philip’s claim had not yet expired.151 The court then held 
that invocation of the discovery rule to allegations of repressed 
memories could not occur without the production of expert testimony.152 
Such a decision, the court claimed, was “consistent with the decisions of 
most courts considering repressed memory syndrome claims” as well as 
Alaska case law requiring expert testimony to prove medical or legal 
malpractice unless the negligence alleged is sufficiently non-technical to 
be cognizable by laypersons.153 The court affirmed the superior court’s 
grant of summary judgment on Maness’s claims, concluding that his 
claims were time-barred in light of his lack of expert testimony.154 
The reasoning behind the court’s holding in Maness, albeit brief, 
addresses valid concerns in dealing with RMS cases. Maness’s alleged 
facts are also fantastical, which may make limit sympathy for this case. 
Nonetheless, the court did not address in their opinion at least three 
areas of importance for potential future RMS plaintiffs. 
 
 144.  Id. at 526 (citations omitted). 
 145.  921 A.2d 1067 (N.J. 2007). 
 146.  Maness, 325 P.3d at 526. 
 147.  Gelpke, 921 A.2d at 582–83. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Maness, 325 P.3d at 526. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. at 526–27. 
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First, the court did not acknowledge the relative uniqueness of its 
rule or acknowledge the controversy in the scientific community 
surrounding repressed memory syndrome. As discussed above, several 
states have allowed RMS claims to extend the statute of limitations 
without the use of expert testimony at the summary judgment stage, 
though they require expert testimony at trial. The court cites cases like 
this,155 in addition cases where expert testimony on RMS is not 
admissible at all under evidentiary standards,156 without making a 
distinction between those holdings and what is being held in Maness. 
RMS and the varying attempts by states to deal with it in court are not 
so easily classified.   
The connection that the court draws between medical and legal 
malpractice suits on the one hand, and child sexual abuse claims on the 
other hand, is furthermore conclusory. Medical malpractice claims have 
statutory provisions allowing for a court-mandated expert panel,157 
while sex abuse victims are not mandated the same luxury. The alleged 
similarities between child molestation and legal malpractice also remain 
to be clarified. 
Finally, the court added in a footnote that given Maness’s failure to 
offer expert testimony, the court would not decide whether even 
properly supported allegations of repressed memory syndrome might 
extend the statute of limitations.158 Thus, it is important to note that that 
discovery rule may potentially be found not to apply to RMS victims, 
even with proper expert testimony, if their abuses occurred prior to the 
enactment of sections 09.10.065 and 09.10.140. 
D.  Due Process  
Maness argued on appeal that “requiring an indigent plaintiff to 
‘hire an expert witness or suffer a summary judgment dismissal’” 
violated due process under both the Alaska and United States 
Constitutions.159 Amendment XIV, Section 1 of the United States 
Constitution provides: 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
 
 155.  E.g., id. at 526 n.15 (citing Moriarty v. Garden Sanctuary Church of God, 
534 S.E.2d 672, 680 (S.C. 2000), which holds that expert testimony is required to 
prove at trial that plaintiff recovered a repressed memory.) 
 156.  E.g., id. at 526 n.15 (citing Doe v. Archdiocese of Saint Paul, 817 N.W.2d 
150, 171 (Minn. 2012)). 
 157.  ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536 (2006). 
 158.  Maness, 325 P.3d at 527 n.20. 
 159.  Id. at 527 (citations omitted). 
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shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.160 
Similarly, Article I, section 7 of the Constitution of the State of 
Alaska provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law. The right of all persons to fair and 
just treatment in the course of legislative and executive investigations 
shall not be infringed.”161  
 Access to the court system has been recognized as an important 
right both federally and in Alaska,162 particularly for certain indigent 
litigants.163 Alaska has furthermore recognized a right of access to the 
judicial system beyond that recognized in United States Supreme Court 
case law.164 
Questions of substantive due process ask whether the 
government’s deprivation of a person’s life, liberty, or property is 
justified.165 The three elements of a substantive due process claim are as 
follows: first, there must be a deprivation; second, it must be of life, 
liberty, or property; and third, the government did not have an adequate 
justification for its action.166 A justification is inadequate if it is not 
sufficiently substantive.167 
The court analyzed the claims for both state and federal law 
simultaneously, by “comparing the private interest involved and the 
risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest against the government’s 
 
 160.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 161.  ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 162.  See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) (“In short, 
‘within the limits of practicability,’ a State must afford to all individuals a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard if it is to fulfill the promise of the Due 
Process Clause.”); Patrick v. Lynden Transport, Inc., 765 P.2d 1375, 1379 (Alaska 
1988) (“We have construed the right to court access under the Alaska 
Constitution to be an important right.”). 
 163.  See, e.g., Boddie, 401 U.S. at 385 (“[M]arriage and its dissolution are so 
important that an unhappy couple who are indigent should have access to the 
divorce courts free of charge.”); Varilek v. City of Houston, 104 P.3d 849, 855 
(“‘[p]rohibitive’ filing fees should not be allowed to hamper an indigent 
litigant’s access to the justice system . . . .”). 
 164.  Varilek, 104 P.3d at 853–54 (“Alaska is not precluded from offering 
greater rights and legal protections to its citizens than those offered by the 
federal government. Accordingly, we have not limited the right to access 
Alaskan courts without fees to indigents claiming “fundamental family 
interests.” Rather, we have widened the right of access to the judicial system 
beyond the Boddie line of cases.”). 
 165.  Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1501 
(1999). 
 166.  Id. at 1527. 
 167.  Id. at 1501. 
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interest, including the fiscal and administrative burden of additional 
procedural safeguards.”168 In doing so, the court described the private 
interest involved in Maness’s case as “the right of access to the courts to 
pursue a personal injury claim” and determined the right was 
“important but not fundamental.”169 The compelling state interest, the 
court found, was the purpose of the statute of limitations: to protect 
defendants and the courts from having to prosecute cases where 
necessary evidence is no longer available.170 In comparing these two 
aspects of Maness’s claim, the court determined that—despite Alaska 
Supreme Court case law finding that preventing an individual from civil 
court access “rends the fabric of justice”171 and both Alaska and United 
States Supreme Court case law holding that prohibitively high filing fees 
violate due process172—requiring RMS plaintiffs to provide expert 
testimony prior to jury access did not violate an individual’s due process 
rights under either the United States or Alaska Constitutions.173 The 
analysis did not include any consideration of alternative procedural 
requirements to protect against stale claims or delve deeply into how 
other state courts have handled the issue. The court instead stated that 
requiring expert testimony at the pleadings stage of the case addressed a 
legitimate concern and that paying for such testimony for indigent civil 
litigants would be expensive.174 
Further justification provided for the decision included federal 
cases holding that there are situations in which a party may, consistent 
with due process, be required to bear the reasonable expenses involved 
in proving or defending a civil case.175 McNeil v. Lowney,176 a Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals case, concerned an inmate’s denied requests 
for subpoenas requesting the testimony of his treating physicians in 
light of his inability to pay witness fees.177 Failing to find an abuse of 
discretion, the court noted that “the right of access to the courts does not 
independently include a waiver of witness fees so that the indigent 
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litigant can present his case fully to the court.”178 Relatedly, in Johnson v. 
Hubbard,179 the Sixth Circuit held as constitutional the denial of the 
district court to pay the witness fees of a psychopath involuntarily 
committed to a mental hospital.180 Along with these cases, the Alaska 
Supreme Court found its decision in Maness consistent with previous 
denials of providing state-paid medical experts to indigent medical 
malpractice plaintiffs.181 
III. ALTERNATIVE LEGAL SOLUTIONS  
A few states have designed alternative solutions to dealing with the 
concerns surrounding RMS. Though both California and Louisiana 
allow application of the discovery rule to RMS cases, those states also 
require the filing of a certificate of merit stating that the attorney of an 
RMS case has conversed with a licensed mental health practitioner and 
received advice.182 Failure to do so results in sanctions183 and, in 
California, the possibility of paying a defendant’s attorneys’ fees.184 
California courts will also not name a defendant in a RMS complaint 
without corroborating evidence.185  
Additional ideas include requiring that the RMS plaintiffs be 
treated by a licensed therapist in order for the discovery doctrine to be 
applied, and sealing RMS-related complaints given the chance of false 
accusations.186 Other states have disallowed claims for childhood sexual 
abuse against defendants who have died.187 Still other states have 
enacted RMS statutes limiting the time an individual can file a claim to 
after they have reached the age of majority.188 Distinctively, Colorado 
limits the recoverable damages in childhood sex abuse claims brought 
after the plaintiff turns thirty-three, in which case only psychological 
expenses and attorneys’ fees will be permitted.189 
Psychologists continue to suggest alternative legal approaches to 
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RMS claims as well. In Holdsworth’s article on the RMS controversy, she 
discusses the proposition of a Truth and Responsibility in Mental Health 
Practices Act, which would require therapists to obtain informed 
consent of clients to all psychological treatment modalities before using 
them.190 Failure to do so would result in license revocation.191 
It is unclear in Maness192 whether the Alaska Supreme Court 
considered these alternatives in crafting its opinion, but the option to 
implement such changes remains available to the legislature. States 
discontent with their current approach to RMS cases may also benefit 
from considering these alternatives should the opportunity for change 
arise. 
CONCLUSION 
Maness is a critical decision for any potential RMS plaintiff in 
Alaska whose abuse occurred prior to 2001. These individuals will need 
to finance expert testimony for the chance to see their day in court, at 
which point Alaska courts may still be able to refuse to allow the 
discovery rule to apply. It is unclear to what extent the expert testimony 
must corroborate the plaintiff’s claims. 
 Maness also leads to additional, related questions. For example, 
Alaska courts have yet to determine how to deal with defendants of 
RMS cases who may want to sue plaintiffs’ therapists for malpractice. 
The Alaska Supreme Court has generally approached duty of care issues 
by first determining whether an actionable duty exists by statute or 
existing precedent.193 If one does not exist, there is likely no duty for an 
individual to protect another from a third party unless that person 
“stands in a special relationship to either the dangerous person or the 
potential victim, [and] the defendant is required to control the 
dangerous person or warn or otherwise protect the victim.”194 The court 
has additionally held that confidentiality statutes do not necessarily 
nullify such a duty in the case of substance abuse treatment facility 
employees.195 A case in Alaska has yet to occur where a third party sues 
therapists for malpractice in light of implanted memories. It seems 
unlikely, but should Alaska courts see an increase in RMS cases in the 
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future, the prevalence of therapist malpractice suits in the state may also 
increase. 
Fortunately for RMS plaintiffs who fall under section 09.10.065 or 
section 09.10.140, paying for expert testimony for the sole purpose of 
bringing a claim is not necessary. However, the extent to which Alaska 
courts will allow experts to testify as to RMS diagnosis has yet to be 
determined. Maness does not discuss any limitations of such expert 
testimony, as the case did not go to trial. Alaska has adopted the Daubert 
two-part test for expert testimony admissibility, but in light of the 
controversy surrounding the acceptance of RMS in the scientific 
community and the problems surrounding empirical tests, it is not clear 
what a given court would decide, although Alaska’s Rules of Evidence 
“contemplate a broad[] inquiry, allowing a proponent to establish 
admissibility even if general acceptance is absent.”196 
What is known is this: the Alaska Supreme Court has finally 
responded to the national RMS controversy with unique, thought-
provoking rule, the ramifications of which will be felt in the years to 
come. 
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